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"marital propeny" under the statute, the 
court did not agree. Niroo at 237, 545 A.2d 
at 40. 
Alternatively, Mr. Niroo aruged that the 
trial coun erred in not finding that cenain 
debt that he incurred - advances received 
in the form of a loan from Penn Life -
should have been construed as marital 
debt, and thus offset against the present 
value of the commissions. This would pos-
sibly have had the effect of reducing Mrs. 
Niroo's monetary award. Although the 
court did not agree with Mr. Niroo's cal-
culations, it did agree that the advances 
were marital debts and should be offset 
against the commissions. Subsequently, 
the case was remanded for funher consid-
eration in determining the proper mone-
tary award. 
The Niroo coun is splitting judicial hairs 
on the definition of marital propeny. It 
has determined that the rights to renewal 
commissions that vested during the mar-
riage are contractual rights and are, there-
fore, enforceable as a propeny right rather 
than as a mere conditional expectation. 
The distinction to be made is that the 
court refused to recognize as marital prop-
erty earnings which were speculative and 
nontransferable, such as a medical degree 
or license; yet determined that the right to 
future earnings that vested during the 
marriage were marital property because 
they were less speculative and were 
transferable. 
- Peter T. McDowell 
Craig 'V. State: SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION IS 
NOT ABSOLUTE IN Clflm ABUSE 
CASES 
In Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 544 
A.2d 784 (1988), the Coun of Special 
Appeals of Maryland held that the 
Maryland statute that allows alleged child 
abuse victims to testify over closed circuit 
television, if it is determined that testifying 
in the courtroom will so traumatize the 
child-witness that the child will be unable 
to reasonably communicate, does not vio-
late the six amendment's confrontation 
clause. 
Sandra Ann Craig was the owner and 
operator of a pre-kindergarten and kinder-
garten school in Howard County. Brooke 
Etze attended Craig's school for two years, 
had never complained to her parents of 
any abusive treatment, and her parents had 
ex:pressed satisfaction with Craig and her 
school. After reading a newspaper account 
of complaints of abuse at Craig's school, 
Mr. and Mrs. Etze attended a meeting 
hosted by Howard County's social serv-
ices and health departments. As a result of 
what they learned at the meeting, the 
Etze's had Brooke evaluated by a therapist. 
During conversations with the therapist 
and her parents, Brooke disclosed several 
incidents of abuse committed by Craig, 
two of Craig's children, and other children 
at the school. It was revealed that "[t]he 
direct abuse by Ms. Craig included kicking 
Brooke on the legs and in her 'private 
parts,' inserting a stick in her vagina, and 
threatening her with the loss of her 
parents' love." A medical examination 
confirmed sexual abuse. Id. at 255, 544 
A.2d at 786. 
Ultimately, a six-count indictment was 
returned in the Circuit Court for Howard 
County against Sandra Craig, who was 
tried and convicted of all counts in a jury 
trial. Craig appealed to the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland, raising seven 
issues. The court of special appeals found 
no merit in any of the complaints and 
affirmed the conviction. This article 
addresses Craig's complaint that "the 
coun erred in allowing the children to tes-
tify on closed circuit television" in viola-
tion of the sixth amendment's 
confrontation clause. Id. at 257, 544 A.2d 
at 786. 
The trial coun applied section 9-102 of 
the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings Code in allowing Brooke and several 
other children to testify during the trial 
through closed circuit television. Md. Cts. 
& Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-102 (1984). 
Section 9-102 provides that in a case of 
child abuse, the coun may allow a child's 
testimony taken outside the counroom in 
a child abuse trial if "(i) the testimony is 
taken during the proceeding and (ii) the 
judge determines that the child testifying 
in the counroom will result in the child 
suffering serious emotional distress such 
that the child cannot reasonably commu-
nicate." Id. at 275, 544 A.2d at 786. Craig's 
complaint was in effect a three-part issue. 
She contended that section 9-102 "vio-
late[d] her Constitutional right of confron-
tation; (2) the coun failed to follow the 
proper procedure in concluding that the 
children would suffer serious emotional 
distress such that they would be unable to 
reasonably communicate if required to tes-
tify in coun; and (3) '" § 9-102 ... vio-
lated her right of presence." Id. 
The Craig trial court did not have the 
benefit of an appellate decision concerning 
the construction of section 9-102. Conse-
quently, the main thrust of Craig's attack 
focused on Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 
496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987), which was de-
cided after her verdicts were rendered. 
Wildermuth concerned a challenge that the 
procedure stated in section 9-102 contra-
vened a defendant's right of confrontation 
and presence. However, subsequent to 
Wildermuth, the U.S. Supreme Coun 
decided Coy v. Iowa, __ U.S. __ ,108 
S. Ct. 2798 (1988), which also "addressed 
the confrontation issues raised by pr~ 
dures impairing face-to-face contact 
between child-witnesses and defendants on 
trial for having allegedly abused them." 76 
Md. App. at 275-76, 544 A.2d at 796. 
In Coy, the defendant was charged with 
having assaulted two 13-year old girls. The 
trial judge, without inquiring whether the 
assaulted children would be able to testify 
in Coy's presence and acting pursuant to a 
recently enacted state statute, permitted a 
semi-opaque screen to be placed in the 
courtroom between the witness stand and 
Coy. Coy was able to dimly see the 
witnesses but the witnesses were not able 
to see him. The state had sought to justify 
the procedure on the ground that there 
was a legislatively imposed presumption of 
trauma, thereby avoiding a specific finding 
of necessity for separating the victims 
from the defendant. The state also argued 
that there was no violation of Coy's right 
to confrontation since his right of cross-
examination was left intact. Id. 
Justice Scalia authored the Supreme 
Court's majority decision that rejected the 
state's two arguments. The Court held that 
the right of confrontation required more 
than just the ability to cross-examine but 
also included the right to meet one's accus-
er face-to-face. Additionally, the Coun 
rejected the state's contention that its sta-
tute could, on its own, supply the necessi-
ty, and stressed the lack of individualized 
findings. Nevertheless, the Court did not 
completely rule out exceptions to this find-
ing, but simply stated that the question of 
whether any exceptions may exist would 
have to wait for another day. Id. at 27&-77, 
544 A.2d at 797. In the concurring opin-
ion, Justice O'Connor made clear, howev-
er, that the face-to-face confrontation 
requirement was "not absolute but rather 
may give way ... to other competing 
interests so as to permit the use of certain 
procedural devices to shield a child witness 
from the trauma of courtroom testi-
mony." Id. at 278, 544 A.2d at 797-98 
(quoting Coy, __ U.S. at -> 108 S. Ct. 
at 2803). 
The Craig court concluded that the Coy 
Court did not firmly rule out exceptions 
to the face-to-face confrontation clause 
requirement nor did it rule out as an excep-
tion a state's interest in protecting child-
witnesses from being traumatized while 
testifying in a courtroom in the presence of 
the defendant. The court noted that, even 
though Justice Scalia's opinion may have 
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suggested ":hat a closed circuit television 
arrangemem based on a 'case-specific find-
ing of nece..sity' would be regarded as 
impermissible under the Confrontation 
Clause, that view was not shared by more 
than four of the justices who sat on the 
case." Id at 280, 544 A.2d at 798. 
Therefore, the Craig court felt com-
pelled by necessity to decide the issue of 
exceptions to the confrontation clause that 
the Supreme Court had chosen to reserve 
for another day. The court, taking guid-
ance from the Court of Appeals' of 
Maryland analysis in Wildermuth and fol-
lowing Justice O'Connor's lead in her con-
curring opinion in Coy, held that: 
(1) the requirement of a face-to-face 
meeting in court is not absolute, but 
does admit of exceptions; (2) where a 
face-to-face meeting would, in fact, so 
traumatize a child-witness as to pre-
vent him or her from reasonably com-
municating, the State may provide for 
the testimony to be taken in a setting 
that, as nearly as practicable, preserves 
all other aspects embodied in the right 
of confrontation, but does not require 
the witness to look directly upon the 
defendant or to testify in his direct 
physical presence; and (3) if § 9-102 is 
implemented in the manner prescribed 
by Wildermuth, the implementation 
will not be deemed so violative of the 
defendant's right of confrontation as 
to constitute reversible error. 
Id at 280-81, 544 A.2d at 799 (emphasis in 
the original). 
The procedure authorized in the 
Maryland statute and used in this case did 
not amount to the kind of face-ta-face con-
frontation that the Supreme Court held 
was envisioned by the sixth amendment. 
The child-witnesses testified from the 
judge's chamber in the presence of a prose-
cutor, the lead defense attorney, and a 
technician, while the judge and everyone 
else remained in the courtroom. The pro-
ceedings were broadcast through a closed 
circuit television setup, with Craig having 
access to her attorney through a private 
telephone line. The court of special appeals 
conceded that if the confrontation require-
ment were absolute as interpreted by 
Justice Scalia, the "procedure [used in 
Craig] would not pass muster." Id at 281, 
. 544 A.2d at 799. However, the court 
emphasized that the requirement was not 
so rigid since "neither the Supreme Court 
nor the Maryland Court of Appeals-the 
two courts that bind us-has ever held any 
. aspect of the Confrontation Clause ... to 
the absolute." Id 
In Wildermuth, the court of appeals held 
that the right to face-to-face confrontation 
was to be tempered by public policy con-
siderations by which the state has a legiti-
mate and compelling interest in 
authorizing the procedure stated in section 
9-102. Articulating that interest more spe-
cifically, the Craig court held that the state 
has a two-fold interest in allowing the testi-
mony of a child abuse victim to be given 
over closed circuit television. Foremost is 
the fact that if the child-witness is so 
traumatized by the confrontation so as to 
be unable to testify, the truth of the matter 
may never be revealed. Secondly, the state 
has a legitimate interest in protecting 
children generally from such trauma. Id at 
282-83, 544 A.2d at 800. 
Craig's second argument was that the 
trial court failed to follow the proper pro-
cedure stated in section 9-102. Citing Coy, 
the court reemphasized that no indivi-
dualized findings were made that the child-
witnesses needed special protection in 
providing face-to-face testimony when the 
Supreme Court overturned that decision. 
The court distinguished Wildermuth in 
that that court's finding was based on testi-
mony as to general perceptions on the dif-
ficulty children may have had testifying in 
court with the alleged abuser's presence. 
Id at 285, 544 A.2d at 801. In the instant 
case, there was specific, focused testimony 
on each child by trained personnel that the 
child-witnesses would have extreme diffi-
culty testifying in the presence of Craig 
which satisfied the requirements of the sta-
tute. 
Finally, the court addressed Craig's 
assertion of right of presence. The Wilder· 
muth court had also considered the argu-
ment that the closed circuit television 
procedure authorized by section 9-102 via-
lated the defendant's common law and due 
process right of presence, because the 
witnesses and defendant were separated 
during testimony. The Wildermuth court 
rejected that contention since the defen-
dant could hear the questions being asked 
and answered, could see the proceedings, 
and could readily communicate with his 
attorney. Thus, the Wildermuth court held 
that "[t]he statutory procedure did not 
thwart a fair and just hearing in terms of 
due process' and there was 'no violation of 
[the defendant's] due process right to be 
present.'" Id at 287-88, quoting Wilder· 
muth, 310 Md. at 529, 530 A.2d at 291. 
Craig had essentially the same setup and 
was given ample opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses. Also, there was no 
violation of the common law right of pres-
ence since it had been modified by statute. 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland has carved out an exception in 
the sixth amendment's confrontation 
clause concerning child abuse cases. Citing 
strong public policy and the state's legiti-
mate interest in protecting children gener-
ally from abuse, the court has made a 
strong statement in both upholding the 
accused's rights but also protecting child-
witnesses from being traumatized by the 
courtroom experience. 
- George L Cintron 
Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical 
Center: SURVIVAL ACTIONS BASED 
ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
ACCRUE UPON DISCOVERY AND 
FRAUD STATUTE TOLLS TIME FOR 
FILING WRONGFUL DEATH 
ClAIMS 
In Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical 
Center, 313 Md. 301, 545 A.2d 658 (1988), 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that a wrongful death and survival action, 
based on medical malpractice, accrues 
upon discovery of fraud and that Md. Cts. 
& Jud. Proc. Code Ann. 55-203 (1984 
Repl. vol.) operates to toll the time for fil-
ing a wrongful death claim. 
Plaintiff Elaine Geisz (Elaine), as per-
sonal representative of the estate of Steven 
F. Geisz (Geisz) and as mother and next 
friend of Steven Geisz, II, brought a sur-
vival action and a wrongful death claim 
against Greater Baltimore Medical Center 
(GBMC) and Dr. George J. Richards, Jr., 
alleging medical malpractice ten years after 
Geisz died of Hodgkin's disease. The Cir-
cuit Court for Baltimore County entered 
summary judgment in favor of the defen-
dants finding that the survival action 
accrued, as a matter of law, upon the death 
of Geisz and that the Plaintiff failed to 
show facts to support a finding of fraud to 
toll the general three year statute of limita-
tions to bring a wrongful death claim. 
Assuming that the summary judgment 
record could support a finding of fraud, 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
nevertheless held that Elaine and Geisz 
"by the exercise of ordinary diligence 
should have discovered the fraud" more 
than three years prior to the filing of the 
wrongful death claim. Geisz v. GBMC, 71 
Md. App. 538, 526 A.2d 635 (1987). The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted cer-
tiorari to address the issue of whether the 
survival claim and the wrongful death 
action were time barred pursuant to 55-
203. 
In 1971, Geisz had been diagnosed as suf-
fering from Hodgkin's disease and had 
been referred to Dr. Richards, who was 
chief of radiation therapy at GBMC. At 
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